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Abstract 
Increasing private wildfire risk mitigation is an important part of the larger forest 
restoration policy challenge. Data from an economic experiment are used to evaluate 
the effectiveness of providing fuel reductions on public land adjacent to private land to 
induce private wildfire risk mitigation. Results show evidence of “crowding out” where 
public spending can decrease the level of private risk mitigation. Findings also indicate 
that spending on private mitigation efforts increase when information about individual 
expenditures are made available and spending on public land fuel reductions are 
conditional upon a threshold level of private mitigation effort being achieved. 
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Introduction 
Responding to increasing wildfire risk is an important policy challenge in the Western 
U.S. and elsewhere (Donovan and Brown, 2005). Defined as “the area where houses 
meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland vegetation,” the wildland–urban interface 
(WUI) is an area of particular significance (Hammer et al., 2008, p. 5). Land ownership 
in the WUI commonly follows a mosaic pattern, where the intermixed public and private 
land make wildfire risk a collective problem. Referred to as the “mitigation paradox” 
(Steelman, 2007), private landowners and communities frequently fail to undertake 
sufficient wildfire risk mitigation. The objective of this paper is to use the tools of 
experimental economics to help design and explore policy packages for confronting the 
mitigation paradox, and inducing increased private risk mitigation. 
 
Surveys of homeowners indicate that conditions on adjacent properties are an important 
consideration in mitigation decisions (Brenkert et al., 2005). WUI homeowners 
recognize the threat of wildfire as a collective problem. Forest management regimes are 
increasingly accounting for this by providing risk mitigation on publicly owned lands 
adjacent to privately owned lands (U.S. Congress, 2000, 2009). The effectiveness of 
these types of policies to induce additional private risk mitigation is unclear and 
motivates this research. 
 
Data from a computerized laboratory experiment (with 244 participants and 2490 
choices) are used to explore the potential response of WUI homeowners to the 
introduction of policy tools. The experimental design builds on a number of recent 
studies (McKee et al., 2004; Talberth et al., 2006; Berrens et al., 2007) with the current 
focus on two potential policies that recognize the prevalent public–private land mosaic 
in the WUI: (i) a policy where wildfire risk mitigation takes place on surrounding public 
land; and (ii) a policy where mitigation on surrounding public land takes place only if a 
threshold number of individuals have undertaken mitigation efforts. The modeling of 
participants’ mitigation decisions controls for risk aversion, social trust and the provision 
of information. There are a total of six experiment treatment cells. Two policy treatments 
are compared against a no action baseline case, and all three settings are then 
evaluated with and without information on the risk mitigation behavior of other 
participants being provided. 
 
Results indicate that public land fuels reductions can have the unintended effect of 
decreasing the amount of private risk mitigation. However, a simulated policy where 
public land fuel reduction is conditioned upon a threshold level of private risk mitigation 
while simultaneously providing collective information describing each participant’s 
mitigation expenditure is shown to not only increase private spending on wildfire risk 
mitigation but also the likelihood of an individual undertaking such action. 
 
Background and motivation 
The wildfire problem in the Western U.S., and elsewhere, is worsening due to a 
combination of natural and human factors. The WUI is expanding. During the 1990s, the 
WUI grew in area by 19% and in number of households by 22%, such that in 2000, the 
WUI represented 11% of the total land area (715,000 km2) and 38% of all housing units 
(44.3 million) for the coterminous US (Hammer et al., 2008). Fuel loads have also 
grown, as wildfire has been increasingly suppressed in effort to protect homes situated 
in the WUI (Kovacs, 2001; Donovan and Brown, 2005). Combined with long-term 
drought and accumulating fuel loads, the expansion of the WUI has significantly 
increased the risk of high intensity fires (USDA, 2003; Donovan and Brown, 2005; 
Westerling et al., 2006). 
 
As a result, large wildfires are occurring more often and are burning an expanding area. 
On USDA Forest Service lands for example, average annual acres burned increased 
from 285,000 from 1970 to 1986 to 1,000,000 from 1987 to 2002 (Calkin et al., 2005). 
The pecuniary costs of wildfire are also rising; nominal annual federal appropriations in 
the US for wildland fire management activities have increased from an average of $1.2 
billion from fiscal years 1996–2000 to an average of $2.9 billion during fiscal years 
2001–2007 (Nazzaro, 2009). Suppression costs typically account for more than 60% of 
the annual federal costs of wildfire management activities and are growing as well (US 
Government Accountability Office, 2007). These rising costs combined with the 
recognition of wildfire as a natural and beneficial process have lead to growing 
sentiment that a suppression-centered wildfire policy is unwise (Franklin and Agee, 
2003; Berry, 2007; Donovan and Brown, 2007). 
 
Moving away from a costly policy focus on suppression requires the re-introduction of 
natural fire regimes at a landscape scale (Franklin and Agee, 2003; Donovan and 
Brown, 2007), while also targeting fuel reduction and risk mitigation efforts to protect at-
risk WUI communities (Harbour et al., 2009).  
 
These risk-mitigating efforts include: reducing the volume of fuel in an area, using flame 
resistant building materials, applying flame retardants, creating strategic breaks in fuel 
sources, and removing ladder fuels that facilitate the spread of fires into the forest 
canopy (Murnane, 2006). Because mitigation can potentially reduce the suppression 
and aesthetic costs associated with wildfire in the WUI a change in priorities, which 
increases focus on preventative actions, is underway (O’Toole, 2006; USDA, 2006). 
 
Although fuel reduction projects on public lands are an ongoing part of the National Fire 
Plan (USDA and US Department of Interior, 2000) and Healthy Forest Restoration Act 
of 2003 (U.S. Congress, 2003), wildfire risk mitigation by government alone is 
insufficient on three counts. First, a significant amount of forested land (58% in the U.S.) 
is privately owned (Smith et al., 2004). Second, the scope of wildfire is such that there is 
simply too much land in need of fuel reductions to be paid for with public funds alone. 
Recent analyses find that nearly 400 million acres of forestland across the U.S. are 
characterized as either at a “moderate” or “high” risk of catastrophic fire (Power, 2006). 
Juxtaposed against these 400 million acres in need of fuel reduction, the federal 
government has financed projects on less than 3 million acres in recent years (Power, 
2006). Third, inefficient levels of wildfire risk mitigation are expected from individuals in 
the WUI because of the risk externalities associated with fuel treatments (Crowley et al., 
2009). Here, risk externalities (sometimes called adjacency externalities) describe the 
wildfire characteristic of risk being shared across property lines, and that actions taken 
to mitigate wildfire risk on one property, concurrently reduce the risk of fire in the 
surrounding area (Konoshima et al., 2008). In this way, wildfire risk mitigation can be 
thought of as a public good (Busby and Albers, 2010). The behavior of individuals 
confronting shared wildfire risk is consistent with theoretical predictions; private 
individuals do not undertake a sufficient level of wildfire risk mitigation (Steelman, 2007). 
This suggests a potential role for policy to induce WUI homeowners to undertake risk 
mitigation. 
 
In practice, a varied set of policy responses are being implemented, including 
subsidizing private spending on fuel treatments,2 enacting legislation that marries 
insurance availability and premiums to risk mitigating behavior (Wallace, 2005), and 
providing education about wildfire risk and fuel reductions (Sturtevant and McCaffrey, 
2006). This paper focuses on the effectiveness of a specific approach: providing wildfire 
risk mitigation on public lands that are adjacent to privately owned lands. 
 
A number of collaborative, community-forestry-based management programs have 
been implemented that fund risk mitigation on public lands, which are adjacent to 
private lands. One notable example is the ongoing federal Collaborative Forest 
Restoration Program (CFRP) in New Mexico, and potentially at a broader national level 
the recently enacted Forest Landscape Restoration Program (FLRP) (U.S. Congress, 
2000, 2009). One rationale underlying these programs is that landowners’ mitigation 
decisions are increasingly thought to be influenced by the extent of risk mitigation taking 
place in the surrounding area (Brenkert et al., 2005; Martin et al., 2007). While 
evaluation of the effectiveness of collaborative, community forest management 
programs has begun (American Forests et al., 2005; Prante et al., 2007), the potential 
of fuel reductions on public lands to generate wildfire risk mitigation on adjacent private 
lands remains largely unknown. 
 
The issue of how to induce private wildfire risk mitigation is attracting increasing 
attention from researchers. Two lines of work are particularly relevant here: one set of 
analyses have addressed the issue with theoretical models and the use of numerical 
simulation (Amacher et al., 2005, 2006; Lankoande, 2005; Shafran, 2008a; Crowley et 
al., 2009), and a second set of studies making use of laboratory experiments (McKee et 
al., 2004; Talberth et al., 2006; Berrens et al., 2007; Shafran, 2008b). Evidence from 
both lines of research suggests that policy can be effective in inducing private risk 
mitigation. However, this is tempered by the observation of policy in some instances 
crowding out private risk mitigation (McKee et al., 2004; Berrens et al., 2007; Crowley et 
al., 2009). While the overall objective of increasing private spending on wildfire risk 
mitigation is important, there is also a need to identify policy tools which both ameliorate 
crowding out, and allow for continued public spending on wildfire risk mitigation. 
 
Experiment design 
The experiment took place during the fall 2007, spring 2008, and fall 2008 semesters at 
the University of Alaska, Fairbanks. Prior to administration of the experiment an 
extensive series of test sessions were conducted. Data from the test sessions were 
used to refine the presentation of the experiment and parameterize the computing 
functions supporting the experiment. Once pretesting was complete, undergraduate 
student were randomly recruited from across the university as subjects. Groups of 12 
subjects participated in each session. The experiment was administered using a 
network of 12 interfaced laptop computers and an independent server. Upon entering 
the lab, each subject was randomly assigned to a computer workstation in a privacy 
carrel. Each carrel contained a networked laptop computer, a preamble to the 
experiment, and a satellite photo showing an example of a home situated in WUI 
setting. The photo provided a visual context of a WUI type setting for the subject but did 
not delineate between public and private lands. The preamble detailed the nature of 
wildfire risk facing WUI homeowners, identified how mitigation efforts reduce the risk of 
wildfire and wildfire related damages to themselves and their neighbors, and detailed 
the private financial protections offered by insurance. The preamble also detailed the 
experiment instructions to the participants and explained that they would be paid in US 
dollars at the end of the session. To ensure that subjects understood both the 
experiment context and the instructions the proctor read the preamble aloud as subjects 
followed along with their hard copies. Once the proctor finished reading the preamble, 
participants were given an opportunity to ask questions. During a session participants 
were able to access the experiment instructions and other relevant information directly 
on the computers by “clicking” on-screen information tabs. 
 
To mirror the relevant features of an environment with intermixed publicly and privately 
owned land, a circular arrangement of 12 private and four public land parcels was 
placed at the lower left hand corner of each computer screen. Each of the 12 
participants represented a WUI homeowner owning one of the parcels. The 
arrangement of parcels in the diagram was distinct to each computer; accordingly the 
experimenter was able to ensure that each participant saw that their parcel was 
adjacent to a publicly owned parcel. Participants were also aware that the adjoining 
private parcels were not necessarily owned by the individual in the neighboring carrel.  
Although no specific cross-parcel effects were modeled, the value of each participant’s 
parcel was affected by the number of individuals undertaking mitigation and the 
aggregate level of expenditures. The four parcels of publicly owned land were controlled 
by the experimenter and were used to simulate the policy tools under evaluation. In 
rounds where public land mitigation was taking place the color coding of the public 
parcels changed and a description was placed above the diagram. The diagram was 
also used to convey the prior round private mitigation expenditures for all participants in 
treatments where such information was made public. 
 
Each session consisted of two practice rounds and ten live rounds. During the practice 
rounds subjects were able to familiarize themselves with the computer interface and the 
nature of the experiment. Once the practice rounds were complete subjects were 
notified that the following rounds were live and that their decisions would affect their 
actual payment. To help minimize the potential for end of session strategic behavior 
participants were not aware of how many rounds were to take place. 
 
Within a session each participant was endowed with a “home asset,” denominated in 
lab dollars ($lab). An income stream equal to 10% of the “home asset” value was 
generated in each round. Home asset value and round income information were clearly 
identified in a text box in the upper left hand corner of the screen. Subjects allocated 
round income among three goods: (1) A “Mitigation” good which represented 
expenditures on real world risk mitigating processes such as fuel reductions, (2) an 
“Insurance” good which approximated real world spending on insurance, and (3) 
participants were also able to allocate round income to a “Savings” good. 
 
There were two benefits derived from spending on the “Mitigation” good. First, the 
probability that the session group experienced a wildfire event at the end of a round was 
reduced. Second, spending on “Mitigation” reduced the magnitude of the loss 
participants experienced if a wildfire event occurred. As defined, a wildfire event is 
probabilistic occurrence of wildfire which has the potential to negatively impact the 
subjects’ home asset. To capture the positive externalities associated with wildfire risk 
mitigation in real world situations the benefit of a lab dollar spent on the “mitigation” 
good accrued to not only the individual spending that lab dollar, but to the group as a 
whole. Thus, the probability of a wildfire event occurring and the severity of that event 
were reduced for all participants when mitigation was undertaken. 
 
For the “Insurance” good the premium was identical for all participants with one lab 
dollar resulting in a reimbursement 16 lab dollars to the “home asset” value if a wildfire 
event occurred. Participants were able to insure up to 90% of the “home asset” value of 
the current round. Insurance purchases reduced the exposure of the individual subject 
and did not extend to other participants. Finally, insurance was only good for the current 
round. 
 
Finally, a subject’s spending on “Savings” did not impact wildfire behavior in the 
experiment. Saved funds could not be used in following rounds; instead accrued funds 
were tracked and included in the calculation of the final payment for participating in the 
experiment. The “Savings” amount was also displayed in the upper left hand corner of 
the screen. The behavior of interest is how participants distributed the income earned in 
each round among “Mitigation,” “Insurance,” and “Savings” as experimental treatments 
were introduced. 
 
In order to simplify how participants input their expenditure decisions two sets of “drag 
and scroll” “sliders” were placed on the right hand side of the screen. The first set of 
“sliders” was used to input the subject’s spending allocations on the three goods. The 
second set of “sliders” could be used by participants to evaluate the impact of their 
spending decision on the wildfire event probability and “home asset” value under 
assumed levels of group mitigation efforts and total expenditures. Subjects drag 
scrollbars representing the number of participants undertaking risk mitigation and the 
level of mitigation undertaken by the group, respectively. As participants change their 
estimate of what the group will do, the estimated probability of a wildfire event and 
potential losses presented at the bottom right corner of the screen were updated. The 
advantage of using sliders is that the complicated process of wildfire risk mitigation 
could be simplified and presented in a comprehensible way. Once all subjects had 
submitted their spending allocation, a random draw to determine whether the group 
experienced a wildfire event took place. To simplify, it was assumed that, in the case of 
a wildfire event, the entire landscape burned. Consequently, each participant’s home 
asset decreased in value and, subsequently, reduced their income stream in future 
rounds. For any individual subject, the actual decline in home asset value was a 
function of the risk reduction activities they and other participants chose to pursue. 
 
Wildfire events in the experiment were designed to follow the properties of wildfire in the 
WUI. Risk mitigation has the potential to reduce the severity of a fire by reducing the 
amount of available fuel to burn (Kovacs, 2001). Fuel reductions can also reduce 
wildfire severity by inhibiting the spread into the forest canopy where fuel is abundant 
(USDA, 2003). Homeowner’s risk exposure is thought to be determined not only by the 
conditions on their property, but also by the conditions of the surrounding landscape 
(Finney, 2006; Scott, 2006). Further, because wildfire risk is shared, the effectiveness of 
risk mitigation also depends upon the conditions on surrounding lands (Shafran, 2008a). 
Though weather and topography cannot be altered by mitigation, reducing fuel loads 
provides homeowners a way to offset the impacts that wildfire may have on their 
property (van Wagtendonk, 1996; Finney, 2001). 
 
Wildfire risk is complex. In real world applications, the efficacy of risk mitigating 
behaviors to reduce risk exposure varies as local geographies change. To simplify this 
complexity the probability of a wildfire event is modeled as a function of the sum of all 
participants spending on “Mitigation” in the round, the number of participants’ engaging 
in mitigation, and the number of rounds that have elapsed since the previous wildfire 
event (this simulates fuel accumulation in the absence of wildfire). The relationship 
between mitigation actions and the wildfire event probability is given by Eq. (1): 
 
(1)    
 
where _ is the probability of a wildfire event occurring, RE is the rounds elapsed since 
the last wildfire event, N is the number of participants mitigating, and GMIT is the sum of 
all participants spending on “Mitigation” in the round. While this function is a 
simplification, the key components of wildfire risk and mitigation impacts are present. 
The effectiveness of mitigation efforts depends not only upon the level of expenditures 
(GMIT) but also the number of individuals participating. The function assumes a 
nonlinear relationship between “Mitigation” and wildfire risk, where the total benefit of 
mitigation dollars increase at a diminishing rate. With respect to RE, accumulated fuel 
loads are assumed to increase the probability of a wildfire event. If a wildfire event took 
place in a preceding round, RE was set to a value of zero, and the accumulation 
process started over. 
 
Given the level of complexity, participants do not directly observe Eq. (1). Instead, 
subjects could see how much each lab dollar spent on mitigation reduced risk exposure 
using the “sliders.” The severity of a wildfire event is measured by the loss in value of a 
participant’s home asset. The loss of home asset value is a function of the sum of all 
participants’ spending on “mitigation” in the round and the number of participants 
engaging in mitigation. If a wildfire event takes place in a round, the loss (severity) was 
determined by Eq. (2): 
 
(2)    
 
LOSS is the proportion of a participant’s home asset value that is lost due to the wildfire 
event, N is the number of participants mitigating, and GMIT is the sum of all participants 
spending on “Mitigation” in the round. Based on (2) the effectiveness of GMIT increases 
as the number of individuals mitigating (N) grows. As before, participants use the sliders 
to form estimates of how spending on “Mitigation” and the number of participants 
undertaking mitigation will reduce the severity of a potential loss. 
 
The home asset value on a round by round basis is a function of the severity of a 
wildfire event and the participant’s insurance expenditures (Eq. (3)): 
 
(3)    
 
where Vr + 1 is the value of a participant’s home asset in the next round (r + 1), Vr is the 
value of a participant’s home asset in the current round (r), LOSS is the proportion of a 
participant’s home asset value that is lost due to the wildfire as determined by (2), and 
INSi is the number of $LAB the participant spent on the good “Insurance” in the round, 
which is then multiplied by the reimbursement to the home asset value. Recall that the 
LOSS value, as defined in (2), is a function of both the sum of mitigation expenditures 
(GMIT) made by other participants and the number (N) of participants undertaking 
mitigation actions. Thus, the home asset value of a participant is determined by the 
subject’s actions and the mitigation behaviors of other participants. 
 
A factorial experimental design is used; refer to Table 2 for a summary of the 
treatments. Noted in the previous section, we are interested in how the introduction of 
the simulated policy of fuel treatments taking place on adjacent public land influences 
participant behavior. Such a policy is simulated in the experiment by manipulating Eqs. 
(1) and (2). For treatments where mitigation has taken place on publicly owned land, N 
is increased by 4 to reflect simulated treatments on 4 parcels of public land and GMIT 
by $LAB 60,000 to simulate $LAB 15,000 of “Mitigation” spending on each of these 4 
parcels. Additionally, we examine the influence of making participant spending 
decisions publicly known. In sessions implemented “With Information,” participants 
could use the circular diagram to view the mitigation spending of others in the previous 
round; this is in contrast to sessions implemented “Without Information” where the 
circular diagram only showed the parcels and the participant’s mitigation spending. 
 
Once all of the rounds were complete the participants lab earning were converted to US 
dollars and displayed on screen. There were four components to participant earnings for 
the experiment: (1) the sum of a participant’s spending on “Savings” for each round, (2) 
the participant’s earnings from a risk elicitation task, (3) 50% of the participant’s asset 
value at the conclusion of the experiment, (4) and a “show up” payment of five dollars. 
On average, the experiment lasted 1 h and 15 min and subjects were paid $31.87 for 
their participation. 
 
Data analysis 
In all 22 sessions involving 244 subjects were completed, generating 2490 decisions for 
analysis. Given that there are multiple observations from each subject, panel estimation 
techniques were used. The econometric analysis assumes that participant behavior with 
respect to decisions over spending on wildfire risk mitigation in the experiment can be 
characterized by the following model: 
 
(4)   
 
where XTreatment is a vector of variables describing the experiment treatment invoked 
(e.g., public lands fuels reduction undertaken), XNon-Treatment-Characteristics is a 
vector of variables that control for differences in sessions or rounds not attributed to 
changes in experiment treatments, XAttitudinal-Description is a vector of variables 
characterizing participants’ responses to a set of questions regarding risk and trust, and 
XDemographics is a vector of demographic variables. 
 
Success for wildfire policy can be defined in several ways. As a result, the econometric 
approach uses several models. One possible policy goal is to increase the level of 
wildfire risk mitigation that WUI homeowners undertake. Proponents of this goal argue 
that because WUI homeowners accrue much of the benefit of wildfire risk mitigation, 
policy should focus on shifting more of the corresponding financial burden of providing 
these treatments to these individuals (O’Toole, 2006; USDA, 2006). The variable MIT is 
defined as the number of lab dollars a participant allocates to the good “Mitigation” in a 
round and is used as the dependent variable in the first of the estimated models. The 
spending of participant ion MIT is modeled as follows: 
 
(5)    
 
where ˛ represents an intercept term, ˇ represents the estimable coefficients 
corresponding to the vectors of explanatory variables, and ei is an error term. Another 
perspective is that the policy objective should be more general, and that alongside 
increasing mitigation spending should be the goal of increasing private spending on 
insurance. Insurance has obvious benefits at an individual level and public benefits 
insofar as homeowners with adequate insurance coverage from private markets are 
less likely to require public assistance in the event of a disaster. The variables 
INSURANCE and TOTAL are created to reflect this possible goal. INSURANCE is the 
number of lab dollars a participant allocates to the good “Insurance” in a round and 
TOTAL is defined as the sum of INSURANCE and MIT within a round. The spending of 
participant i on TOTAL is modeled with Eq. (6): 
 
(6)    
 
where again ˛ represents an intercept term, ˇ represents the estimable coefficients 
corresponding to the vectors of explanatory variables, and ei is an error term. 
 
Finally, increasing the number of homeowners that undertake mitigation is an additional 
potential policy goal. The variable MITDV is created to evaluate this objective. MITDV is 
a dummy variable coded as 1 where a participant undertakes some mitigation and 0 
otherwise. Defining X as the groups of variables introduced above in XTreatment, 
XDemographics, XAttitudinal-Description, and XNon-Treatment Session Characteristics, 
and ˚as the standard normal cumulative distribution,9 the decision of whether to allo-
cate any lab dollars to “Mitigation” is analyzed with random effects probit modeling (7): 
 
(7)    
 
For each model, multiple observations are taken from the same session. A concern is 
that the error terms for such observations are not independent. As a result, random 
effects modeling is used to analyze the data for each of the three models presented 
here. 
 
By using three models that differ in dependent variables but are similar in the sets of 
regressors included in the specifications presented here, a framework is constructed to 
examine the impact of potential policy tools on a varied set of possible objectives. 
 
Table 1 presents a list of the variables used in the modeling and descriptive statistics. 
The vector XTreatment is made up of a set of dummy variables that distinguish the 
sessions by the policy regime implemented. Table 2 provides descriptions of the 
treatments implemented in the experiment. Both of the policy tools are implemented in 
the experiment in two ways: once “with information” where participants have access to a 
map on the screen that provides a description of all participants’ mitigation spending in 
the previous round, and one “without information,” where participants’ mitigation 
spending decisions are kept private. 
 
Used for comparison against treatments where explicit policy tools are implemented, 
two variables designate the baseline case where no policy is invoked. BASEWO and 
BASEW are dummy variables coded as 1 where no policy tool is implemented (without 
and with information, respectively), and 0 otherwise. 
 
The variable PL TREATED WO and PL TREATED W are dummy variables coded as 1 
for sessions where the experimenter has simulated mitigation taking place on the public 
land (without and with information, respectively) and 0 otherwise.11 Fuel treatments on 
public land have in some instances been conditional on the commitment exhibited to the 
problem on surrounding private lands (Prante et al., 2007). An example is the 
community collaboration requirements of cost-share programs for treating public lands 
in the federal Collaborative Forest Restoration Program (CFRP) in New Mexico (Prante 
et al., 2007). The variables POSSIBLE PLT WO and POSSIBLE PLT W are created to 
analyze the effectiveness of making fuel treatment on public land contingent upon a 
threshold of private participation. The dummy variables POSSIBLE PLT WO and 
POSSIBLE PLT W are coded as 1 for treatments where the public land in the 
experiment is treated only if six or more participants undertake mitigation in the previous 
round (without and with information, respectively). 
 
Transitioning to the control variables, the vector XNon-Treatment-Characteristics is a 
set of variables that distinguish session or round characteristics. The variable ROUND 
INC is defined as the number of lab dollars a participant receives at the outset of each 
round to allocate between “mitigation,” “insurance,” and “savings.” The variable 
WEALTH is defined as the sum of a participant’s “savings” through the current 
completed round. Within a session, the time elapsed since a wildfire occurred varies by 
round and has the potential to influence behavior. The variable FIREPREV is a dummy 
variable coded as 1 if a fire occurred in the previous round, 0 otherwise. The final two 
variables included in this category measure the level of interaction a participant exhibits 
with the software. DIAGRAM is a dummy variable coded as 1 where a participant 
decided to view a map that provided a more detailed description of the allocation 
decisions of others than is presented, and 0 otherwise. The variable SLIDER is a 
dummy  
 
Table 1 Variable descriptions and summary statistics (N = 2490). 
 
 
 
Table 2 Treatment table. 
 
coded as 1 if a participant adjusted the slider corresponding to group “mitigation” to 
evaluate how the probability and severity of wildfire change with group spending on 
“mitigation” and 0 otherwise. 
 
The vector XAttitudinal-Description is made up of variables that capture differences in 
participant responses to a set of questions after the experiment. Because participants 
are asked to make decisions that impact probabilities of an uncertain payoff, it is 
especially important to control for risk preferences. To this end, subjects participated in 
a widely used risk preference elicitation task (Holt and Laury, 2002). In this task, each 
made a series of choices between two payoff options, one providing a lower payoff with 
certainty and the other providing either a higher payoff or nothing at varying 
probabilities. The behavior of interest is at the point where the probability of getting the 
higher payoff increases such that a participant switches from preferring the sure payoff 
to the gamble. Using observed choices in this task as a measure of risk preferences, a 
dummy variable was constructed to sort participants by risk aversion. RISKAV is a 
dummy variable coded as 1 if a participant displayed risk-averse preferences in the risk 
elicitation task, and 0 otherwise. Results from this elicitation task are revealed after the 
wildfire experiment. 
 
In addition to controlling for risk preferences, XAttitudinal-Description also includes a 
variable that controls for participants’ beliefs regarding social capital. The General 
Social Survey (GSS) is an extensive survey with the objective of collecting data to 
monitor and characterize trends in American culture. While the GSS has been used in 
addressing a variety of social science questions, it is increasingly being used in 
economics analyses involving collective action (Karlan, 2005). An index created from 
responses to a question from the GSS is used here as a proxy for social capital. The 
question put to participants was the GSS trust question, “Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?”15 Participants select one of six responses to the question that best describes 
their beliefs. A set of dummy variables has been created here to correspond with these 
responses. The variable TRUST is a dummy coded as 1 where a participant selects the 
option most consistent with well developed social capital (“Most people can be trusted”). 
The dummy variable NTRUST is coded as 1 where a participant selects the response 
most consistent with a lack of social capital (“You can’t be too careful”). These two 
variables are summed to construct a trust index. The variable T INDEX is defined as 
TRUST-NTRUST, so that the variable takes the value of a 1 for trusting participants, −1 
for non-trusting participants, and 0 if the participant selected any of the other possible 
responses to the trust question (“It Depends,” “Don’t Know,” “No Answer,” or “Not 
Applicable”). 
 
The vector XDemographics includes a set of control variables. Participants report 
demographic information at the conclusion of the experiment. FEMALE is a dummy 
coded as 1 if a participant identifies themselves as female, 0 otherwise. AGE is the age 
in years of the participant. The variable EDUCATION is the number of years of formal 
education. Not to be confused with their income earned in the experiment, the variable 
ANNUAL INC is defined as a participant’s annual income. HOMEOWNER is a dummy 
coded as 1 where a participant owns their home, 0 otherwise. XDemographics includes 
dummy variables that control for political party affiliation. DEMOCRAT and 
REPUBLICAN are dummy variables coded as 1 for membership in the identified party 
and 0 otherwise, and OTHERPARTY is a dummy coded as 1 for participants that do not 
identify their political party as Democrat or Republican, and 0 otherwise. 
 
A summary of statistical hypotheses is presented in Table 3 and a summary of the 
results of these hypotheses is presented in Table 5. The expectation is that simulated 
policies of wildfire risk mitigation on public land will increase risk-mitigating behavior in 
the experiment for each of the three measure of success introduced previously (the 
level of spending on mitigation, the level of total protective spending, and the probability 
that a participant engages in mitigation). Additionally, a final hypothesis of the 
relationship between social capital (as measured by trust) and mitigation is presented. 
As with the expectations for the simulated policies, it is posited that social capital and 
mitigation expenditures are positively related. Each hypothesis is tested against a null 
hypothesis of no statistically significant influence relative to the baseline treatments. 
 
Table 3 Hypotheses. 
 
 
Econometric results 
Estimation results are presented in Table 4 and are organized according to the 
dependent variable analyzed. Results for MITDV are presented as Models 1A and 1B, 
for MIT, Models 2A and 2B, and for TOTAL, Models 3A and 3B. Trimmed and an 
extended specifications are presented for each of the three dependent variables used. 
Additional specifications were also evaluated, with results qualitatively consistent with 
the modeling presented here (available upon request). A Hausman test is used to 
evaluate the random effects modeling. For the extended specification using the 
dependent variable MIT (Model 2B), the chi-squared test statistic is −34.44, indicating 
that the estimated coefficients in the random effects model are statistically similar to the 
coefficients from a fixed effects model (known to produce consistent estimates). 
 
For Models 1A and 1B, the results are mixed. The estimated coefficients for the 
variables PL TREATED WO and POSSIBLE PLT WO are positive but statistically 
significant for only one specification. This implies that when fuel reductions are 
simulated on publicly owned parcels and participant spending is kept private, subjects 
are not more likely to undertake risk mitigation than in the baseline session. Similarly, 
the statistically insignificant coefficients for BASE W indicate that making subject 
spending public did not, by itself, increase the probability of mitigation. However, 
simulating fuel reductions on publicly owned parcels is effective when participant 
spending is made public. The estimated coefficients for PL TREATED W and 
POSSIBLE PLT W are positive and statistically significant in 3 of 4 specifications 
presented. The results suggest that the likelihood of a subject engaging in risk 
mitigation increases when public fuel reductions were made in conjunction with 
information about mitigation efforts of other participants being provided. The estimated 
coefficient for T INDEX is not statistically significant for this set of models. 
 
The marginal effects presented in brackets in Table 4 show the change in probability of 
undertaking risk mitigation as the variable of interest changes from 0 to 1. Marginal 
effects for this model are calculated as: 
 
(8)    
 
The marginal effects for PL TREATED WO and PL TREATED W in the extended 
specification are relatively large, 0.06 and 0.11 respectively. 
 
Of the control variables, the estimated coefficients for WEALTH and AGE are negative 
and statistically significant, suggesting that participants that have allocated more to 
“Savings” in previous rounds are older and less likely to undertake risk mitigation. The 
estimated coefficient for FEMALE is positive and significant indicating that female 
participants are more likely to undertake mitigation than the base case (males). The 
coefficients for the remaining control variables are not statistically significant. 
 
As with the results discussed above, the impact of simulated fuel reductions on the level 
of participant spending is influenced by whether participants had information describing 
one another’s spending. Shown in Models 2A and 2B, the negative and significant 
coefficients for PL TREATED WO and POSSIBLE PLT WO (negative but not significant 
in the trimmed specification) suggest that spending  
 
Table 4 Random effects regression results (N = 2490). 
 
Table 5 Summary of hypotheses. The influence of the policy tool on the dependent variable is 
listed in each cell. 
 
 
on fuel reductions on publicly owned parcels is replacing private spending. As observed 
elsewhere (McKee et al., 2004; Berrens et al., 2007), subjects in these sessions spent 
less on risk mitigation than their counterparts in baseline sessions. Significantly though, 
providing information about the mitigation expenditures of other group participants 
ameliorates the crowding out. The estimated coefficients for PL TREATED W are not 
statistically significant. It appears that the addition of information about participant 
mitigation expenditures mutes the negative influence observed in the PL TREATED WO 
sessions. Further, the estimated coefficients for POSSIBLE PLT W are positive and 
statistically significant. The behavior observed here suggests that a policy of making 
fuel reductions on publicly owned parcels contingent on private spending can 
successfully induce private risk mitigation when information about the mitigation efforts 
of other individuals is made available. There is a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for T INDEX, indicating that participants that are more trusting spend more 
on risk mitigation than their counterparts. 
 
Of the control variables included in Models 2A and 2B, the estimated coefficients for 
WEALTH, RISKAV, AGE, and FEMALE are negative and significant. The estimated 
coefficients for DIAGRAM, SLIDER, T INDEX, HOMEOWNER, and REPUBLICAN are 
positive and significant. The coefficients for the remaining control variables are not 
statistically significant for this set of models. 
 
Simulated fuel reductions on publicly owned parcels did influence mitigation total 
protective spending (TOTAL).18 In Models 3A and 3B, estimated coefficients for PL 
TREATED WO and POSSIBLE PLT WO are negative and statistically significant in 3 of 
4 models. This finding indicates that the policy tool has reduced private spending. As 
evidenced by the positive and significant estimate on POSSIBLE PLT W, crowding out 
is offset when information about participant mitigation expenditures is provided in 
conjunction with fuel reductions on public parcels. As before, the negative and 
significant coefficient for BASE W suggests that it is the combination of fuel reductions 
and the provision of mitigation information, rather than fuel reduction or information 
alone, which generates increased mitigation spending. Participants that are more 
trusting spend higher amounts on mitigation and insurance in sum as shown by the 
significant positive coefficient for T INDEX. 
 
Of the control variables in Model 3B, the estimated coefficients for ROUND INC, 
FIREPREV, DIAGRAM, T INDEX, and REPUBLICAN are positive and statistically 
significant. The estimated coefficients for WEALTH, RISKAV, FEMALE, and 
EDUCATION are negative and significant. The coefficients for all other variables are not 
statistically distinct from zero in these models. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of providing fuel reduction on 
adjacent publicly owned lands at increasing private spending on wildfire risk mitigation. 
Using the observed decisions of participants as a policy guidepost, several observations 
stand out.  
 
The results suggest that policy tools intending to induce WUI homeowners to engage in 
risk mitigation have the potential to reduce private spending. This effect is identified 
both for treatments that simulate risk mitigation taking place on public lands irrespective 
of private behavior and for treatments that offer risk mitigation on public lands 
conditional upon a sufficient number of individuals undertaking private risk mitigation. In 
this light, particular care should be taken in policy design to avoid the crowding out of 
private spending on risk mitigation. 
 
Importantly, the estimated models reveal a specific antidote for this unintended effect: 
disseminating particular information on the behavior of others sharing the same risk 
externality. Behavior in the experiment is influenced by both simulated fuel reductions 
on public land and the provision of information. Robust across multiple models and 
specifications, we find that when implemented alongside a policy of fuel reductions on 
public lands, providing participants with information describing each other’s mitigation 
decisions dampens the degree to which private spending is reduced. In addition, when 
this information is provided along with a policy of contingent fuel reduction on public 
lands, participants increase their spending on wildfire risk mitigation. Similar impacts in 
different experimental settings have been found elsewhere. Shang and Croson (2009) 
found that social information increased voluntary contributions to a public radio station. 
Like Shang and Croson (2009), our explanations as to why this occurs are speculative 
and the subject for future research. 
 
Because programs like New Mexico’s federal Collaborative Forest Restoration Program 
(CFRP) [and by inference the newly initiated, national-level Forest Landscape 
Restoration Program (FLRP)] are costly to implement relative to standard fuels 
reduction efforts, whether they generate spillover mitigation on adjacent private lands is 
an important consideration. That is, attempting to develop social capital by adding 
collaboration and community-capacity building requirements to fuels reduction projects 
(or funding opportunities) increases project costs, but may generate important spillover 
benefits. Shepherd et al. (2009) provide recent evidence that relative to other National 
Fire Plan fuels reduction projects, CFRP projects in New Mexico exhibit significantly 
improved social equity effects by better targeting poor communities, with no identifiable 
loss in risk targeting. This supports the potential of such programs to induce increased 
private mitigation. However, given that participants in the experiment increase mitigation 
spending only when information is provided in conjunction with providing fuel reductions 
on public lands that are conditional on private participation, we find both that both 
aspects of the policy prescription are important. 
 
Providing fuel treatments on publicly owned lands has a disparate influence on 
seemingly similar measures of mitigating behavior. This can be observed in the results 
from sessions where fuel reductions took place without information about private 
mitigation efforts being provided (PL TREATED WO). Here, the policy tool increases the 
probability that a participant will undertake some mitigation but decreases the level of 
spending on mitigation. It is therefore possible to increase the number individuals 
engaging in wildfire risk mitigation (e.g., possibly through a demonstration effect) while 
at the same time decreasing the total level of mitigation (e.g., a possible crowding out 
effect). Given the spatial complexities of wildfire risk, it is not obvious whether the 
negative impact of decreased aggregate expenditures outweighs the positive impact of 
more people mitigating. Results suggest that policymakers may have to prioritize among 
policy objectives, weighing the potential gains associated with more individuals 
undertaking wildfire risk mitigation with costs associated with a reduction in the total 
level of risk mitigation that takes place. 
 
Finally, the importance of information dissemination in observed mitigation decisions 
underscores the idea that social factors are critical in analyzing the “Mitigation Paradox.” 
It has been suggested that developing social capital in forest communities is a 
worthwhile goal of policy, insofar as increased social capital can lead to increased levels 
of participation and/or private spending on wildfire risk mitigation. Again, this idea 
appears to be at least part of the motivation behind community forestry-based cost-
share programs (e.g., CFRP and FLRP). The observed behavior here that higher levels 
of trust are a positive determinant of mitigation spending suggests that developing 
social capital is a worthwhile endeavor for policy. 
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